

Religiocentrism and Voting Intention Among University Students in the 2024 Indonesian General Election: A Social Identity Perspective

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Keyword: general election 2024; intention to choose; religious identity; religiocentrism; political participation.	Abstract This study aimed to examine the extent to which religious identity and past experience of political participation can explain individuals' intention to vote in the 2024 general election in Indonesia. A total of 320 respondents were recruited through convenience sampling techniques in Bandung and Cimahi. The results show that only the religiocentrism dimension was positively associated with the intention to vote, while other dimensions such as religious practice and intratextual fundamentalism were negatively related. In addition, the results showed that the experience of political participation in the past was not positively related to the intention to vote in the 2024 general election. This could be explained through religiocentrism's tendency to encourage individuals to view their religious ingroup as better than religious outgroups, leading them to choose leaders who align with the values of their religious identity. On the other hand, past experience of political participation might have caused individual disappointment with political practices in Indonesia which are still tainted by corruption and nepotism, so they felt that their political participation had no significant impact. These findings provided a new perspective on individual's intention to use their political rights in Indonesian general election.		
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INTRODUCTION

As the third-largest democracy in the world, Indonesia is an interesting country to review in terms of political participation. Since the reformation period, voter's participation in Indonesia has actually decreased, although the shadow of the authoritarian regime no longer haunts (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2023). At the beginning of the reformation era, the election report shows that 92.70% of voters participated in the general election. Recently, despite still recording a high level, the voter turnout has never reached back to 90%: the 2019 election recorded a rate of 81.69%-81.97% and the recently passed 2024 election recorded 81.78% (Hendarto, 2024; Sadya, 2022).

In a democratic world, the level of political participation is certainly a special concern, because public involvement plays an important role in the direction of government policy. Conversely, government policy will also be closely related to social development in the community (Gil de Zúñiga, 2012). For example, blocking or releasing certain social media can play a role in lowering or improving the community's economy. Therefore, investigations on political participation in Indonesia are very important to evaluate people's electoral behavior, yet this is still rarely found in the psychology literature today. Although voting behavior is also closely related to individual factors, such as group identity and even individual personality (Kopko, 2012; Weber et al., 2011).

Voting intention, as operationalized in this study, refers to an individual's expressed readiness to exercise their electoral right in the 2024 Indonesian general election. Within the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), voting intention is the proximal cognitive antecedent of actual voting behavior: individuals who report strong intentions are significantly more likely to cast their ballot on election day (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheeran & Webb, 2016). Importantly, voting intention is analytically distinct from actual turnout; the gap between stated intention and behavior is well-documented in Indonesia, where logistical, administrative, and motivational barriers can prevent even strongly motivated citizens from participating (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2023; KPU, 2024). Low voting intention carries significant implications for democratic governance, including reduced electoral legitimacy, diminished representativeness of elected bodies, and attenuated accountability of political leaders to their constituents (Dalton, 2004).

To fill the gaps in the current literature, particularly in Indonesia, we will focus on individuals' intention to vote in the 2024 general election. Behavioral intention is part of the TPB by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977). The theory states that the relationship between attitude and behavior is strong only if the intention to perform the behavior is also strong. In other words, the higher the individual's intention to perform a particular behavior, the more likely the individual will actually carry it out. Three important components influence the degree of behavioral intention. First, subjective norms are espoused by individuals or refer to the consensus of the behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001). For example, individuals who have positive subjective norms toward participating in elections tend to show higher voting intention. Secondly, the individual's attitude toward the behavior plays a crucial role. Similar to the idea of attitude theory, if individuals have a positive attitude towards elections and political participation, then they are more likely to vote in the election. Third, the individual's perceived control of the behavior. Individuals are more likely to exhibit the behavior they are interested in if they feel they have the necessary resources, such as time, to perform it.

In this study, we only focused on the behavioral intention, or, specifically, the intention to vote in the 2024 general election. The three components proposed by the TPB are adjusted to the context of the study, which involves religious identity and previous political participation experiences. Therefore, we are interested in examining whether religious identity and experience of political participation are positively associated with individuals' intention to vote in the 2024 general election.

In detail, social identity is an important part of explaining a person's behavior because most individuals' behavior is based on social categorizations that they consider important to themselves (Setiawan et al., 2024; Tajfel, 1974). In this study, we chose religious identity as the main identity because religiosity in Indonesia is an important and inseparable part of Indonesian society (Hadiz, 2017). Many Indonesians now adopt a more conservative view of religious belief in the public sphere, for example, by adapting sharia law in some Muslim communities in the country (Mulia, 2011). Religious identity can simply be interpreted as the extent to which individuals view their religion as part of their social identity. Based on the framework of social identity theory, individuals who consider religion an important part of their lives usually show adherence to religious practices and norms.

Religious identity in this study follows Tajfel's (1974) Social Identity Theory and Ysseldyk et al.'s (2010) framework of religiosity-as-identity: it refers to the extent to which an individual incorporates religion as a central and valued component of their social self-concept. We assess four empirically distinct dimensions: (1) religious practice or the frequency of behavioral engagement with ritual observance (Scheepers & Eisinga, 2015); (2) religiocentrism or the evaluative tendency to regard one's own religious ingroup as superior to religious outgroups (Sterkens & Anthony, 2008); (3) intratextual fundamentalism or the propensity to treat sacred texts as inerrant, objective truth (Williamson et al., 2010); and (4) religious salience or the perceived centrality of religion to everyday decisions (Eisinga et al., 1991).

As an identity, religion also provides authentic beliefs and contains values and norms that are highly relevant in an individual's social participation in society (Setiawan & Handayani, 2025; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Previous research has shown that societies with strong religious identification tend to be more obedient to authority (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). At the same time, however, high religious identification is also associated with national identification or disidentification (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). In addition, religious identity provides a collective identity that can give rise to feelings of moral superiority, giving rise to feelings of "we are the good people" and "they are the bad people" among members of religious groups, known as religiocentrism (Setiawan et al., 2020). In relation to political participation, therefore, individuals with the same religious affiliation will strive for their political leader, who is considered to have the same religious aspirations, to win the competition (Bruinessen, 2018). Based on this, this study hypothesized that religious identity, demonstrated through dimensions of religious practice, religiocentrism, intratextual fundamentalism, and salience, was positively related to the intention to vote in the 2024 general election (H1).

This hypothesis is grounded in the TPB (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977): prior participatory experience shapes the three TPB antecedents of intention. Repeated political participation builds positive subjective norms (social consensus that voting matters), strengthens pro-participatory attitudes (positive evaluation of electoral engagement), and consolidates perceived behavioral control (confidence in one's ability to navigate the voting process). Additionally, Campbell's (2013) social network model holds that prior participation embeds individuals in civic networks that reinforce participatory norms and provide informational resources, further increasing the probability of future political engagement.

Furthermore, we argued that religious identity did not explain behavioral intention in political participation in isolation. We claimed that individuals' previous experiences of political participation could be associated with their future political participation intention (Abramson et al., 2001). Individuals who were often involved in political discussions, either online or offline, or who have participated in previous elections, can be assumed to be individuals who have norms, positive subjective attitudes, and the resources necessary to participate (see Ekman & Amnå, 2012, and Setiawan et al., 2024 for various activities in political participation). Therefore, in this study, we expected that the experience of individual political participation in the past, both online and offline, was positively related to their intention to vote in the 2024 general election (H2).

This study aims to make three specific contributions to the extant literature. First, it disaggregates religious identity into four theoretically distinct dimensions, an approach rarely adopted in Indonesian electoral research, which has more commonly treated religious identity as a unidimensional construct. Second, it focuses specifically on the 2024 Indonesian general election, providing timely empirical evidence on a politically consequential contest characterized by unusual dynastic features (Kurnia et al., 2024). Third, it applies psychologically validated multi-dimensional measurement instruments (Sterkens & Anthony, 2008; Williamson et al., 2010) that have been used in comparative international research but have not previously been applied together in a single Indonesian electoral study.

To test the hypothesis proposed in the study, we conducted a quantitative survey in communities in Bandung and Cimahi. Specifically, we conducted the research on campus, in accordance with the access we had. The study also collected data on individual characteristics, such as gender and income level. The findings of the study were expected to contribute to the literature on political participation in Indonesian society, which was still very rarely reviewed in psychology, and aimed to inspire other researchers who are interested in community participation, both in exercising electoral rights and in improving policies, such as pro-environmental behavior policies.

METHOD

To address the research questions, we conducted a data collection procedure using a quantitative survey. The selection of cities was carried out purposively, taking into account the resources available to the researchers. The chosen cities were Bandung and Cimahi. Subsequently, the researchers made a list of universities in both cities as research locations, considering the accessibility of these resources. The data collection took place from April to May 2023.

The questionnaire was distributed through visits to several universities in the city of Bandung that had been randomly selected by rolling a dice. The procedure began by making a list of university names in Bandung and Cimahi. Then the researcher rolled a dice to obtain a number to determine which university was used as a starting point. The number shown on a dice was also used as the interval number to go to the next campus. For example, if the number shown from the dice shuffle is number three, then the university that is at number three of the list of universities is the first university target. Next, the researcher would use

the number three as the interval from the first university to the next. That is, the university that is at number six on the list and onwards. This procedure was repeated until we reached the target number of universities that had been determined in advance (based on the availability of resources). In total, there were 15 universities located in Bandung and Cimahi, which were selected as locations to recruit respondents. As of 2023, the Bandung–Cimahi metropolitan area comprised approximately 56 registered higher education institutions (PDDikti, 2023), spanning research universities, polytechnics, and private vocational colleges. The 15 institutions selected represent approximately 26.8% of registered institutions and include a range of institutional types, as shown in Table 1. We acknowledge that full institutional diversity was not captured; this is addressed in the Limitations section. Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents by university.

With respect to political participation behavior, only those aged 18 years and over were selected. The selection of respondents at the location was carried out using convenience sampling: The research team approached a location at a university where there were groups of students and asked for their consent to be respondents (Etikan, 2016). For those who were willing to participate, they were first given informed consent. If they agreed, then they would continue to fill out the research questionnaire. Sample size was determined a priori using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) for multiple linear regression with eight predictors (four religious identity dimensions, one past political participation variable, and three demographic controls). Assuming a medium effect size ($f^2 = .15$; Cohen, 1988), $\alpha = .05$, and desired power of .80, the minimum required sample was $N = 103$. We conservatively targeted $N = 600$ to accommodate potential attrition and multi-site recruitment variation. Overall, we managed to gather 320 respondents from 600 people we met (response rate of 53.3%), with almost half of the people we approached refused to participate. In this study, the research team did not provide rewards for respondents.

Table 1
Distribution of respondents by university

University	Number of people approached	Number of rejections	Number of participations	Response rate
ITENAS	40	19	21	52.5
Politeknik LP3I	40	21	19	47.5
LPKIA	40	21	19	47.5
Universitas Kristen Maranatha	40	20	20	50
Politeknik Garuda	40	21	19	47.5
Politeknik Industri dan Niaga Bandung	40	19	21	52.5
STBA	40	19	21	52.5
STFI	40	21	19	47.5
STHB	40	21	19	47.5
Telkom University	40	0	40	100
UIN	40	19	21	52.5
Universitas Widyatama	40	19	21	52.5
UNJANI	40	21	19	47.5

UNLA	40	19	21	52.5
USB	40	20	20	50
Total	600	280	320	53.3%

Fielding et al. (2008) stated that a person's behavioral tendencies can be seen as the extent to which people indicate their intention to perform a particular behavior, measured by an item, such as "I intend to be involved in an environmental organization for the next 6 months". In this study, we used the same approach and adapted the questions to our context. Here, we asked respondents to rate themselves based on a single statement of behavior toward the 2024 general election. The statement was "You will exercise your right to vote in the 2024 general election," and respondents were asked to choose between 1 "disagree", 2 "undecided", and 3 "agree".

Religious identity in this study is defined as the extent to which individuals behave and believe in accordance with the teachings of their religious affiliation. To measure religious identity, respondents were asked to respond to items relating to religious practices, religious beliefs, and salience (or the significance of) their religion. Religious practice was defined as the extent to which a person performs religious practices according to their religious affiliation. For example, attending religious services according to one's religious affiliation, such as going to church on Sunday or to the mosque on Friday (Setiawan et al., 2024; Scheepers & Eisinga, 2015), or praying every day. Ginges et al. (2009) added that by regularly attending worship, individuals are more likely to be exposed to similar (positive) views of members of their group, and potentially similar (negative) views of outside groups.

We used a simple question to measure respondents' participation in religious practice, namely: "How often do you attend worship in mosques/churches/temples/other places of worship?". Respondents were asked to rate themselves in this question on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 'never' to 7 'several times a day'. Validity testing of three items of religious practice employed CFA in "lavaan" packages at RStudio (Rosseel, 2012). The first model suggested that item 2 ("How often do you attend religious activities in a mosque, church, temple, or other place of worship?") has factor loading below the conformity level, which is a minimum of .30 (Peterson, 2000). Therefore, only two items remain, and testing of validity (as well as reliability) can only proceed using Pearson correlation. The correlation of the two items showed a significant positive relationship, $r(318) = .34$, $p = .00$.

Next, we measured respondents' religious beliefs through a religiocentrism scale consisting of four items adopted from Sterkens and Anthony (2008). The measurement asked respondents to rate themselves using a five-point Likert scale regarding the degree to which they showed positive attitudes toward their religious group as well as negative attitudes toward other religious groups. Attitudes towards one's own religious group are represented by items such as "Thanks to our religion, most of us are good people", while attitudes towards other religious groups are measured by items such as "Other religions only talk about doing good without practicing it". The CFA results showed a good fit model, $\chi^2 = 1.88$, $p = .17$, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05 with factor loading of each item ranging from .38 to .74. The four items were also shown to have a very high level of reliability, which is $\alpha = .93$.

Still, in religious belief, we also used a three-item intratextual fundamentalism scale to assess respondents' propensity to understand sacred texts as the foundation of objective truth (Williamson et al., 2010). This scale puts forward statements such as 'Everything in the scriptures is true without question'. Respondents then rated on a five-point scale, with higher scores reflecting greater agreement with the item: The higher its level of intratextual fundamentalism. The CFA results showed that the model did not have a good match with the data, and it was found that one item ("Meaning in scripture open to change and interpretation") had a low factor loading. Therefore, there are only two items, and we proceeded with Pearson correlation. The correlation between the two items was positive, $r(318)=.58$, $p=.00$.

Finally, we adapted the salience scale from a study by Eisinga et al. (1991), which had also been used by Setiawan et al. (2020) in Indonesian samples. It consisted of three items to measure the extent to which respondents agree that religion played an important role in their daily lives. Respondents rated themselves on a five-point Likert scale on statements such as 'My religious beliefs have a lot of influence on how I make important decisions'. Higher scores reflect greater religious significance. The CFA model showed a mismatch between the model and the data, and one item ("My religious beliefs have a big influence on the way I relate to others") has a low factor loading. The correlation test continued to test the validity of the remaining two items. It was found that the correlation between the two items was positive and significant, namely $r(318)=.63$, $p=.00$.

According to Campbell (2013) and van Deth (2016), political participation can be defined as the involvement of individuals in social activities that can affect political conditions or society, either through online media or offline platforms. In this study, our focus was primarily on individual participation in online and offline political discussions and elections. Respondents were asked to rate themselves based on statements, for example, "You engage in political discussions (local/national) through online, e.g., via FB, IG, Twitter, etc." for online political participation. Then, respondents were also asked to rate statements relating to offline participation. For example, "You exercised your right to vote in the election of the head of the RT/RW". Both statements were scored on a five-point Likert scale, where higher scores indicate higher participation. There are a total of six items for the scale of political participation, with three items for each type of participation.

The CFA results showed that the model could not be generated due to a lack of a definitive positive value. An examination of the correlation between available items revealed a high degree of correlation among the three items measuring offline political participation, indicating multicollinearity. Consequently, only one item from the three available was retained: "You are involved in social and political discussions in the community you are in," in consideration of the level of relevance among respondents. However, the subsequent CFA model still showed a mismatch, indicated by online political participation items that have a low factor loading. Ultimately, only two items remained, each for offline and online political participation. The correlation between the two items was positive and significant, $r(318)=.69$, $p=.00$. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of all variables involved in the study.

It is important to acknowledge the limitations of retaining two-item scales for religious practice, intratextual fundamentalism, salience, and past political participation. Two-item scales have a theoretical ceiling on internal consistency (maximum $\alpha = .50$ for two items with $r = .33$) and preclude formal dimensionality testing via CFA (Eisinga et al., 2013). However, the inter-item correlations for all retained two-item composites were statistically significant and positive ($r = .34$ to $.69$), meeting the minimum criterion for preliminary construct validity. These scales are retained for exploratory purposes; future research should develop psychometrically robust, multi-item Indonesian versions of these instruments.

Table 2

Descriptive statistics for all variables

Variable	Range	Respondents (N=320)	
		Mean	SD
Intention to vote in 2024 election	1-3	1.67	.47
Religious practices	1-7	4.95	.61
Religiocentrism	1-5	1.88	.55
Intratextual fundamentalism	1-5	4.12	.51
Salience	1-5	3.65	.84
Past political participation	1-5	1.40	.44
Individual characteristics			
Age	18-24	20.37	1.61
Gender (female=reference)	0/1	.62	.48
Income level	1-8	2.66	.55

In this study, we also collected first-hand information about several individual characteristics. First, we asked their ages. Second, we asked about the gender of the respondents. Third, we also asked respondents to share their income level. In addition to these questions, we also asked about the respondent's level of education. However, since the respondents obtained were mostly university student groups, this became irrelevant.

We used these characteristics as control variables in our analysis. By including these variables in the final model, we were able to assess whether the relationship between predictors and dependent variables was an actual relationship or perhaps influenced by these individual factors.

After validating all the measurements used, we performed classical assumption tests before performing regression analysis to confirm the hypothesis. We conducted three initial tests, namely normality, linearity, and multicollinearity. All scales in this study have skewness and kurtosis values of less than two, which means that there is no large deviation from normality (Kim, 2013). For linearity, all predictors in this study had significant linear relationships with the dependent variables. Finally, the results of the multicollinearity test indicated that the score variance inflated factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics of each predictor were well above $.2$, meaning the absence of symptoms of multicollinearity (Field, 2009).

Table 3 shows the correlation between variables and indicates that there is no overly high relationship between variables.

Based on these results, we continued the analysis using hierarchical regression. We first created a model by including all the predictors of religious identity. Next, we included predictors of political participation in the second model. Finally, we included respondents' socio-demographic variables as control variables to test whether any previously found associations are due to spurious relationships.

Table 3

Bivariate correlation of variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Intention to vote in 2024 election	1	-.14	.85	-.11	.13	.21
2. Religious practices		1	.06	.40	-.76	-.26
3. Religiocentrism			1	.25	.05	.08
4. Intratextual fundamentalism				1	-.42	-.59
5. Salience					1	.66
6. Past political participation						1

Note: bold indicates significance at $p < .01$.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We performed a hierarchical regression analysis to test the proposed hypothesis. In doing so, we build our statistical models one by one, starting from Model 1, which involved only the constant (mean value when all variables are considered zero) and the variable religious identity (see Table 4). In this model, we found that all religious identity variables correlated with the intention to vote in the 2024 election. However, we found that not all dimensions of religious identity had a positive correlation with the intention to vote. We found that only the religiocentrism dimension had a significant positive correlation with the intention to vote ($b = .82$, $p < .01$). The rest of the religious identity dimensions had a negative correlation. Therefore, it can be concluded that hypothesis 1 (H1) is dominantly rejected.

Next, we created Model 2 by adding political participation experience variables into a previously run statistical model (see Table 4). We found that there was no change in the previously established relationship, and most importantly, Model 2 also showed a significant positive relationship between the experience of political participation and the intention to vote in the 2024 election ($b = .12$, $p < .01$).

Then, in the final model, Model 3, we added individual characteristics to check if there was a false relationship between all the predictors in the previous models and the intention to vote. This may happen in regression models, where individual characteristics play a more important role than the proposed predictors. In Model 3, it was found that gender, especially women (as a reference in the model), had a positive relationship with the intention to vote in the 2024 general election ($b = -.42$, $p < .01$ for men). Age was also found to have a significant positive relationship with the intention to vote in the 2024 election ($b = .02$, $p < .01$). However, the age coefficient is so small that, although significant, it may have no practical significance at all.

Another interesting feature of Model 3 is that there is a drastic change in the coefficient of political participation experience. Although still significant, this variable now has a negative correlation with the intention to vote in the 2024 election ($b = -.25$, $p < .01$). Overall, women who are slightly older ($>.20.37$ or above the average age of respondents) and have engaged in political participation both online and offline, are more likely to have a higher intention to vote in the 2024 election. For men who are also slightly above the average of respondents, the intention to choose was found to be lower than women. Therefore, these results do not confirm hypothesis 2 (H2), that is, there is no positive relationship between political participation in the past and individual intention to vote in the 2024 general election. Overall, each model run can explain the variances that occur in the data very well. Although adjusted R^2 is not the main element in this study, it is important to say that each model proposed can explain variance in the data in a good manner, which is about 87 to 92%.

The unusually high adjusted R^2 values (.87–.92) merit explicit attention. The bivariate correlation between religiocentrism and voting intention ($r = .85$, Table 3) indicates that these two constructs share substantial variance. While VIF values for all predictors remained below 5 and tolerance statistics exceeded .2, confirming the absence of traditional multicollinearity, the exceptionally high r between religiocentrism and the outcome suggests conceptual proximity: individuals who positively evaluate their religious ingroup relative to outgroups may be predisposed to express an intention to vote specifically to support their religiously aligned candidate, making the constructs conceptually adjacent. Future research employing actual voting behaviour (rather than stated intention) and multi-wave designs would help disentangle these constructs and guard against inflated R^2 .

Table 4


Hierarchical regression of intention to vote in 2024 general election (N=320)

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	3.14 (.19)	3.29 (.20)	2.49 (.17)
Religious practices	-.21 (.02)	-.27 (.03)	-.28 (.03)
Religiocentrism	.82 (.02)	.81 (.02)	.94 (.02)
Intratextual fundamentalism	-.33 (.02)	-.28 (.03)	-.28 (.02)
Salience	-.16 (.02)	-.22 (.12)	.02 (.03)
Past political participation		.12 (.04)	-.25 (.04)
<i>Individual characteristics</i>			
Gender (female=reference/0)			-.42 (.03)

Age			.02 (.00)
Income level			.02 (.02)
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	.87	.87	.92

Note: bold indicates significance at p<.01.

This study aimed to assess the extent to which religious identity and experience of political participation could explain individuals' intention to vote in the 2024 general election. The results showed that most hypotheses were not confirmed, and we will provide further explanations in this section. Figure 1 presents the theoretical model assessed.



Religious identity is indeed significantly related to the intention to vote in the 2024 election. However, only religiocentrism has a positive correlation, which also shows the opposite results from a similar study using more heterogeneous samples (Setiawan et al., 2024). Other dimensions of religious identity, such as religious practice, have a negative correlation with voting intention in the 2024 election. First, the results on religiocentrism confirm that identification with a particular religion tends to encourage individuals to view their religious group better than other religious groups (Setiawan et al., 2020). The results of religiocentrism in this study can differ from similar studies because intratextual fundamentalism is measured separately. That is, religiocentrism measures only an individual's subjective evaluation of his or her religious group and other religions. Therefore, it is logical for individuals who have a positive level of evaluation of their religious group to be likely to have the intention to vote in the 2024 election to help their favored political leader, who is considered similar in their religious aspirations, to win (Bruinessen,

2018; Hadiz, 2017). In addition, by taking into account the importance of social media, which allows people to share and exchange information on social and political issues (Santoso et al., 2023), people are likely to follow political issues in accordance with their religious norms. Thus, encouraging them to vote for a political leader who is in line with their religious group.

This finding is explained through Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979): categorisation into a religious ingroup triggers social comparison processes through which ingroup members seek positive distinctiveness. In an electoral context, supporting a religiously aligned political leader becomes a vehicle for affirming the ingroup's superior social standing. Sterkens and Anthony's (2008) concept of religious exclusivism, the belief that one's own religion holds privileged access to truth and virtue, provides the evaluative cognition underpinning religiocentrism in this process (Setiawan et al., 2020). Consistent with Hadiz (2017) and Bruinessen (2018), these dynamics are particularly potent in Indonesian electoral contests where religious identity is actively mobilised as a political signaling device.

Second, other dimensions of religious identity have a negative relationship with the intention to vote for several reasons. One, religious practice does not automatically encourage individuals to gather with members of their religious group and discuss political conditions. Different from those found by Ginges et al. (2010), our sample group was mostly students, and most likely, they would not socialize in the place where they worship. Two, intratextual fundamentalism refers to the tendency to adopt a rigid understanding of religion in the absence of a hermeneutic translation (Williamson et al., 2010). Therefore, they may consider the election not the appropriate way to uphold their religious values, considering that Indonesia is also still overshadowed by many corruption cases (Setiawan et al., 2024; Hartono & Putri, 2014). Finally, salience does not relate to the intention to vote because political participation, especially exercising electoral rights, is viewed as disconnected from the religious values of individuals.

Furthermore, the results demonstrated a lack of positive correlation between past political participation experiences and the intention to vote in the 2024 election. This is contrary to the previous research, which states that past experiences tend to encourage individuals to participate in politics in the future (Setiawan et al., 2024; Campbell, 2013). These results may provide new knowledge about the tendency of individuals to exercise their electoral rights and are not entirely inconsistent with the existing literature. Seeing the context of Indonesia, which still relies on large coalitions in national politics, nepotism in practice, and corruption cases that are also still so many, people who have participated in politics in the past may think that their political participation no longer plays a significant role in the progress of the country (Hartono & Putri, 2014; Tanasaldy, 2012). Therefore, although it does not have a positive correlation with voting intention, the findings on political participation experiences in this study provide new perspectives on individual's beliefs in the elections.

This pattern echoes the concept of political cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997): repeated exposure to political processes that generate no perceived improvement in governance quality depletes civic motivation and generates withdrawal from formal electoral participation. This is also in line with TPB framework, in which individuals' subjective norms, as one of precipitating factors in determining one's

behavioral intention (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), would be shaped by current socio-political conditions resulting from past political participations. Among young Indonesian voters specifically, although they have not had past political participation, this cynicism is likely amplified by the sustained prevalence of corruption among national and regional political leaders (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2023, cited in Hartono & Putri, 2014), the consolidation of political dynasties exemplified by the 2024 candidacy of Gibran Rakabuming Raka as vice-presidential candidate (Kurnia et al., 2024), and the persistence of money politics in local election campaigning (Tanasaldy, 2012). This dynamic, portrayed by those most civically experienced become most disillusioned, constitutes a form of “participation fatigue” (Ekman & Amnå, 2012) that represents a distinctive challenge for Indonesian democratic consolidation.

Third, gender emerged as a primary demographic factor, suggesting that male respondents were less likely to vote compared to females. This finding sheds a new tendency of women participating more intensely in civic spheres, including political votes (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2010). In the Indonesian socio-cultural context, this gender difference may reflect several intersecting dynamics. First, in Indonesian patriarchal social norms, young men may experience greater social permission to disengage from formal civic structures and to express political resistance through non-participation (Carreras, 2018; Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2010). Second, given that religiocentrism is the primary predictor of voting intention in this study, and that women in the sample may have stronger religiously framed civic duty narratives (Ysseldyk et al., 2010), women may be more effectively mobilized through religious community networks toward electoral participation. Third, the higher online political participation reported by men may have generated greater exposure to political cynicism and participation fatigue (Boulianne, 2020; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), reducing their electoral motivation relative to women who engage through offline community channels. These interpretations remain tentative in the absence of direct measures of political cynicism and cultural attitudes and should be tested in future research.

We acknowledge certain limitations to this study. First, the absence of random sampling techniques may introduce sampling bias. Consequently, the findings only describe the sample group currently tested. Therefore, we encourage future research on Indonesian’s political participation to use random sampling techniques and involve a large number of respondents to portray more representative results. Second, this study was conducted in mid-2023, when there had been no significant decisions that changed the map of national politics for the 2024 general election, i.e., the son of President Jokowi running for vice president (Kurnia et al., 2024). Therefore, although the findings of the study provide a new perspective on the portrait of political participation in Bandung and Cimahi, other researchers still must be careful in translating and applying them in further research. Third, the predominantly student sample (ages 18–24, mostly enrolled at Bandung-area universities) limits the generalisability of findings to the broader Indonesian voting-age population. Older voters, rural populations, and those with lower educational attainment may exhibit markedly different patterns of religious identity and voting intention. Fourth, the cross-sectional design precludes causal inference: we cannot determine whether religiocentrism causes voting intention, or whether strong electoral motivation amplifies religious ingroup identification. Fifth,

voting intention was measured using a single three-point item; single-item measures have limited reliability and may not capture the full motivational complexity of electoral intention. Sixth, social desirability bias may inflate reported voting intention, as expressing willingness to vote may be perceived as socially positive. Finally, the retention of two-item scales for several religious identity dimensions constrains the construct-level precision of findings (see Eisinga et al., 2013).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study provides an overview of the extent to which religiocentrism plays a role in determining individual intention to vote in the 2024 general election. Although most hypotheses were not confirmed, it is important to note that the findings of this study still provide a new perspective on the phenomena studied. On one hand, the findings regarding religiocentrism address the debate surrounding the use of identity politics strategies in Indonesian society and explain why this issue will persist in the future. On the other hand, these findings are expected to be used for future research and aid political practitioners in boosting political participation. This includes fostering interfaith dialogue forums to diminish the impact of religiocentrism on political engagement, replacing it with an understanding of the broader importance of participation, not solely concerning electoral rights but also other critical issues, such as pro-environmental policies.

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